Procedural breakdown

A 38-page report issued Wednesday afternoon on the shooting death of a paroled felon in Northwest Pasadena found no criminal wrongdoing on the part of the two officers involved but called into the question some of the procedures they used during the incident and made several recommendations implicitly critical of the department’s internal investigations.

According to the Office of Independent Review (OIR), formed by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors to investigate complaints against the Sheriff’s Department but which also works on cases involving other county law enforcement agencies upon request, methods used by the two officers were not “clear, consistent or focused” on Feb. 19 as they approached a vehicle carrying Leroy Barnes Jr., 38, on Mentone Avenue near Washington Boulevard.

According to Pasadena police, the two officers noticed Barnes duck down in the backseat of the car, as though he was attempting to hide something. The officers — who are not identified in the report — shot Barnes 11 times, once while he was inside the car and 10 more times after he exited the vehicle, following a struggle over a gun.
“When the officers approached the car together, their procedure was not clear, consistent, or focused. The backseat passenger’s ducking down movement raised their apprehensions, but they chose not to treat the incident as a ‘felony stop,’ in which occupants are ordered to exit the vehicle at gunpoint,” the report states.

“Moreover, while they could have, the officers did not order the occupants out of the car or call for backup. One officer approached with his gun drawn; the other officer’s gun was holstered — further indication of an inconsistent approach regarding the appropriate defensive tactics.”

The report further criticizes the officers for not paying attention to the driver of the vehicle, Amika Edwards, during the confrontation. Barnes, who jumped into the back of Edwards’ car as up to 15 other young men ran from the scene when officers drove up, yelled for Edwards to drive off several times.

“The driver was still at the wheel with the engine running. When the officers approached, almost no attention was directed to the driver of the vehicle, even after she started screaming at them. When the officers reached in and attempted to take hold of Barnes, they placed themselves in a very vulnerable position should the car have begun to move forward rapidly, exposing each of them to the distinct likelihood that they could be dragged or run over by the speeding car. … The distinct likelihood that the vehicle was going to lurch forward combined with an uncooperative passenger possibly secreting a weapon created very significant officer-safety issues for both involved PPD personnel. As a result of the officers’ tactics, if the driver had chosen to speed away as they found themselves halfway in the car, off balance, at a position of disadvantage, and engaged in a physical struggle with a soon-to-be-armed suspect, the possible consequences to the officers could have been extremely dire.”

Wednesday’s report stopped short of calling the shooting justified and made 14 recommendations for the department to consider. Pasadena Police Chief Bernard Melekian said that the department would review the report and present its findings to the Pasadena City Council’s Public Safety Committee in December.

In its recommendations regarding investigative procedures, the OIR suggested that interviewers needed to be “trained in the deleterious consequences of asking leading questions” of police personnel, instead using “open-ended and fact-neutral” questions. The report suggests that interaction with civilian witnesses needs improvement too. In the latter area, it was proposed that civilians need to be made aware of the option of being interviewed at the station and, more cryptically, that the investigators should refrain from “using certain interrogative techniques.”

Overall, the report praised the department leadership’s commitment to transparency in handling the case. Melekian had requested the OIR, as well as the FBI and the District Attorney’s Office, to investigate the shooting. The DA’s report also found no wrongdoing on the part of the officers. However, the OIR report adds that transparency in providing timely information is needed, and that the department should “redouble its efforts to ensure that such information is completely accurate before doing so,” no doubt a reference to Chief Melekian’s hasty and later retracted statement that Barnes exited the car and fired the first shot at officers.  

The OIR interviewed homicide detectives, training staff, supervisors and professional standards investigators, and also reviewed police reports, audio tapes, photographic and video evidence, taped interviews and forensic evidence relevant to the case. Although no civilian witnesses were interviewed, the OIR did review audio and written testimony made by witnesses at the scene.

Melekian has refused to release the tape to the Weekly, which has filed a state Public Records Act request to see it, saying the case is still under investigation. Although the FBI was asked to investigate, it was not known if it will.
“As is often the case, there were several tactical options available to the officers,” Melekian wrote in a prepared statement. “The choice they made is problematic because of the outcome and not because it was an inherently poor option. Nevertheless, more intensive training that addresses different tactical options will be implemented. The most challenging to address is the number of shots fired by the officers. Although the number of rounds fired exceeds the department’s training standards, current training also stresses the reduction of the threat. It is also noted by OIR and the coroner’s report that the first round fired was fatal, although not immediately. This incident lasted less than seven seconds from the firing of the first shot to the last. The department found this shooting within policy because of the direct threat to the officers initially and because of the compressed timeframe of the incident.”

OIR Chief Attorney Michael Gennaco, a former federal prosecutor, called the two seconds that elapsed between the first and second shot “critical.” It was during that time that Barnes lost his weapon as he exited (or was dragged from, officers’ accounts differ) the vehicle and fell to the ground. The weapon landed on the ground about four feet from Barnes. The officers said they did not see the gun and fired the additional rounds — seven of them hitting Barnes in the back.

 “Because the evidence is indisputable, the first shot was legitimate and justified,” Gennaco told the Weekly. “There certainly are questions raised as you go down the sequence to the eleventh shot. The department’s decision to find the shooting within policy we think was reasonable. On the other hand, we did think there were some tactical issues that at least ought to be thought about and considered as the department learns from this incident.”

According to the report, if the entire incident is viewed as one continuous event, the shooting is reasonable, because the rationale that justified the first round fired would also dictate the remaining shots because the officers believed Barnes still posed a threat.

However, the report concludes that if the shooting is viewed as a multiple-part event, then the subsequent rounds fired after Barnes exited the vehicle are more problematic because Barnes is no longer in possession of the weapon. The officer stated that since Barnes was on his stomach, they believed he still had the weapon.

Soon after the shooting, Melekian told the media that Barnes had exited the vehicle and shot first at officers. He later recanted that statement. Angry residents living nearby claimed that the department was hiding the truth after the department refused to release videotaped footage of the event.

 Letter from Chief of Police               Report

Recommendation #1: We recommend that the department modify its officer-involved shooting protocols to ensure that training personnel are part of the rollout team.
  
Recommendation #2: We recommend that investigators assigned to conduct interviews of personnel in officer-involved shooting investigations be trained in the deleterious consequences of leading questions in these investigations. We further recommend that the investigators’ supervisors be tasked with reviewing interviews of officers involved in shootings to ensure that such a practice does not occur.
 
Recommendation #3: We recommend that the department formalize its protocols for promoting the cooperation of witnesses while acknowledging their rights under the prevailing circumstances. One option is to use a form and waiver system that clarifies the status of witnesses and their options about traveling to the station to be interviewed. We further recommend that investigators assigned to officer-involved investigations be debriefed on the investigation’s purpose and instructed to refrain from using certain interrogative techniques in interviewing potential witnesses to the incident.
 
Recommendation #4: We recommend that the department modify its officer-involved shooting investigative protocols so that interviewers routinely use diagrams to obtain a permanent account of the sequential positioning of involved personnel and civilians.
 
Recommendation #5: We recommend that PPD investigators eliminate any reference to the Grossman/Lewinski constructs and focus their interviews on learning the involved officers’ observations, positioning, actions, decision-making and state of mind using basic open-ended and fact neutral who, what, when, where, how and why questions.
 
Recommendation #6: The department should develop consistent protocols on whether, prior to being interviewed, involved personnel will be shown video capturing the incident. One possible protocol for the department to consider would be to interview the involved personnel during a walkthrough of the event, allow them to view the video, and then follow up by asking if the video caused them to refresh their recollection about the incident.
 
Recommendation #7: We recommend that the department continue its commitment to transparency in providing timely information to the public, but redouble its efforts to ensure that such information is completely accurate before doing so.
 
Recommendation #8: We recommend that internal supervisory protocols be developed to ensure that the administrative presentation to command staff initiate identification of tactical issues, that use of diagrams, trajectory of bullets, location of casings and other forensic evidence be used to assist in explaining the positioning of individuals at various times during the evidence, that the reference to “force science” issues be eliminated, and that the presenter has a mastery not only of the presentation itself but the complete investigative file so that questions raised by command staff can be adequately addressed.
 
 Recommendation #9: In order for the department to benefit from past shooting incidents, it should ensure enforcement of its officer-involved shooting investigation retention policy so that such investigations are preserved at least throughout the career of each officer. In addition, the administrative review should routinely closely examine past officer-involved shootings or other relevant history of involved officers to identify any commonalities of tactical decision making and decisions to deploy deadly force.  
 
Recommendation #10: We recommend that in officer-involved shooting reviews, training staff be involved in the identification of tactical issues to be presented by  professional standards investigators and be part of the subsequent discussion and assessment of the tactical decision making by involved personnel.
 
Recommendation #11: We recommend that each member of the executive review team be provided access to the officer-involved shooting investigative file prior to the executive review.
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Recommendation #12: The department should require that a timely and robust action plan be devised in every officer-involved shooting. The plan should address issues that may have presented themselves in each of the following areas: shooting scene/rollout response, investigative issues, individual accountability (potential violations of policy), tactical issues, supervisory issues, training issues, equipment issues, and information to the public. In addition to incorporating different strategies and methods to address each issue ranging from policy development to discipline, training and counseling, the action plan should ensure that each impacted unit or individual where issues have been identified is briefed about any concerns raised during the executive review process. The department should further ensure that an effective and timely feedback loop be devised so that the executive review recommendations incorporated into the action plan are implemented. 

Recommendation #13: We recommend that the department require that a training bulletin be devised for every officer-involved shooting that addresses issues identified through the review process.
 
Recommendation #14: The department should develop protocols that provide a mechanism to carefully assess the status and assignment of officers involved in officer-involved shootings during the pendency of the investigation.